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Basic income schemes are frequently derided as being unaffordable[1]. 
In order to assess the theoretical validity of this claim, it is necessary to 
elucidate how a basic income differs from most existing social protection 
schemes. Social protection (often colloquially labelled “benefits” in the 
UK, or “welfare” in the USA[2]) as currently implemented across the 
world has one defining feature: conditionality. 
It is a widespread misconception that this conditionality is related to 
income (or wealth), in part because this superficially appears to be the 
case: support is typically withdrawn as recipients earn more. The way in 
which this is done differs from system to system – there’s a great deal of 
heterogeneity – but from a conceptual point of view all that matters is 
that the level of support is withdrawn as incomes (and sometimes 
wealth) increase. 
However, from a theoretical point of view, this is functionally identical to 
a basic income and (admittedly complex) system of taxes. The reason for 
this is that money is fungible. To see this, let us conduct a thought 
experiment. 
• Example 1: Imagine receiving £1000 in state support. If your income 
increases by £100 and your entitlement to state support reduces by £75 
then your income has increased by £25. The state now pays you £925 
(net) and you earn £100. Your net income is £1025 and the state’s net 
payment is £925. 
• Example 2: Now imagine receiving £1000 as a basic income from the 
state. If your income increases by £100 and you are taxed at a marginal 
tax rate of 75% then your income still increases by £25. Your net income 
is £1025 and the state’s net payment is £925. The two systems are 
identical. 
The first might appear to be more “affordable” since gross state spending 
is £925 rather than £1000, but this is illusory since net spending (and 
marginal taxes) are identical. Most of us receive (in one form or another) 
a basic income, we just don’t see it. To demonstrate this, we use the UK 
as an example – due solely to the authors’ familiarity with the system – 
although the principles are universal. 
In the UK, around 98% of pensioners receive a state pension – 
approximately 12.8m individuals. This is payable irrespective of (other) 
financial circumstances and can therefore clearly be thought of as a form 
of basic income (although it is not a true universal basic income, as there 
remains some conditionality in terms of the recipient’s lifetime national 
insurance contributions). We already pay a (generous) basic income to 
20% of the population. 
Most of the rest of us also receive a form of basic income. However, this 
appears relatively “affordable” because the effective tax payments are 
invisible for most of us. Take, for example, a 30 year-old singleton living 
in Birmingham. Under Universal Credit, they would be entitled to 
£8402.68p.a. As their earnings increase, this is withdrawn at a rate of 63 
pence for each pound of net income. 
Such a system is functionally identical (in the same vein as example 2 
above is identical to example 1) to one in which said individual is paid a 
basic income of £8402.68 and taxed at 63% for the first £9516 of their 
earnings. Between £9516 and £12500 they pay a marginal tax rate of 
67.4% (12% in National Insurance and 63% on the net amount). On 
income between £12500 and £13506.51 they pay a staggering 75% 
(20% in income tax, 12% in National Insurance and 63% on the net 
amount), whilst above this they pay just 32% (32% in income tax and 
12% National Insurance). 
Here we come to the real reason why the existing system appears more 
affordable than a basic income: the cost is front-loaded onto the first few 
thousand pounds of income. A basic income would make this explicit. I 
have yet to see a proposal for a basic income of £9000 paid for with a tax 
of 75% on the first £15,000 of earned income, even though such a 
scheme would probably be affordable, and would resemble the existing 
system[3]. 
There’s a good reason for this: a marginal tax of 75% grossly distorts 
incentives[4]. It renders the effective (after tax) minimum wage a mere 
£2.18 per hour. When one takes into account the cost and time of 
commuting to work, effective take-home pay is likely to be well below £2 
for each hour spent at work or commuting for many. Such amounts leave 
extremely weak incentives to work. 
There are two ways around this. The first is not to front-load the tax 
payments, but instead increase taxes over a wide range of incomes. This 
has the added advantage of being much more progressive: rather than 
individuals on £10,000 paying a marginal tax rate of 75% and those on 
£60,000 paying 42%, you would instead have a situation where both 
paid a marginal rate of 50% and wealth was taxed more heavily than it is 
at present. Here we come to the nub of the situation: most object to a 
universal basic income not because of inherent concerns over 
affordability – since it already exists, for most – but rather out of a belief 
that it would be wrong (or infeasible) to ask the wealthy to share a 
greater proportion of the burden. 
The second alternative is conditionality. With so few carrots, the present 
system needs to wield an almighty stick. Note that this conditionality is 
not related to income (or wealth). It is instead related to non-pecuniary 
(or at least not directly pecuniary) circumstances. 
In most places a key part of this conditionality relates to behaviour – 
usually in terms of a requirement to seek to obtain work. Again, it is 
typical to have certain derogations based on circumstances (disability, 
age etc.) Often, the level of entitlement also depends on circumstances 
(most social protection systems become much more generous with age, 
for example). 
At its most basic, conditionality is a way of excluding certain individuals 
who society deems unworthy of support: those who are able to but do 
not seek work. Put another way, as societies we have decided that those 
who choose not to work deserve poverty and destitution. Ultimately, in 
the absence of economic resources, you die. This is the stick that we 
wield in order to compel individuals to work for £2.18 per hour (less in 
practice). 
This is true no matter how generous the system. As long as it is 
conditional, that is the value judgement we have made. Most systems 
have certain derogations – most commonly for those with very young 
children, the disabled and the elderly. As can be imagined, this almost 
always creates yet more perverse incentives. Conditionality is therefore 
both the defining feature and key weakness of existing social protection 
systems. 
Within the broad context of such conditionality, systems differ 
dramatically in terms of administration and the burden of evidence of 
compliance (or demonstration of extenuating circumstances). Some are 
onerous, whilst others are typically much more lenient. Typically, more 
onerous systems are associated with a high administrative burden 
(which is a pure economic cost) and a high risk of unfairly penalising 
society’s vulnerable individuals, pushing them into destitution. More 
lenient systems are generally associated with higher levels of abuse. 
To conclude, when authors claim that a universal basic income is 
unaffordable, they are actually exhibiting a preference for a tax system 
that imposes much higher marginal rates on the poor than the wealthy 
(whether they mean to or not) and using conditionality to compel the 
poor to work. We believe this is unjust. If you want a true safety net to 
support those facing hardship and poverty, only a universal basic income 
will do. 
[1] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/universal-basic-
income-uk-tories-tories-unaffordable-damian-hinds-labour-green-snp-
a7307476.html 
[2] Whilst they overlap considerably, the usual colloquial meaning 
typically covers only a subset of the total social protection budget. 
Specifically, terms such as “benefits” or “welfare” refer to cash or in-kind 
payments (e.g. food stamps) and do not include directly-provided social 
care (which tends to be predominantly focussed on the elderly, severely 
disabled and vulnerable children). Similarly, colloquial understanding of 
the term “benefits” tends to exclude pensions, in spite of the fact that in 
many places these make up the single largest part of all social 
protection/welfare expenditure. 
[3] There are numerous additional complications relating to the existing 
system. In particular, whilst the UK tax system relates to individual 
incomes, the social protection system is based on household incomes. 
The amounts payable vary dependent on location, age and caring 
responsibilities (mostly but not exclusively related to children). In 
theory, a basic income could vary dependent on location and age, 
although caring responsibilities are more difficult to model (the payment 
is attached to the child, but the support is withdrawn based on the 
income of the guardian). This is only a minor complication: a basic 
income could be paid to the legal guardian of each child (in the case of 
separated parents payments might be split on the basis of court-
determined contact time). 
[4] To put it into context, the UK only levies a marginal tax rate of 47% 
on the very highest earners (the top 1%), and even less on unearned 
income at this level. 
 
